ಸೆರೆವಾಸ

ಕಾನೂನಿನಲ್ಲಿ, ಸೆರೆವಾಸ (ಬಂಧನ) ಎಂದರೆ ಕಾರಾಗೃಹದಂತಹ ಸಾಂಸ್ಥಿಕ ಸ್ಥಳದಲ್ಲಿ ಬಂಧಿಸಲಾಗಿರುವ ಅಥವಾ ಕೂಡಿ ಹಾಕಲಾಗಿರುವ ನಿರ್ದಿಷ್ಟ ಸ್ಥಿತಿ.^[೧] ಒಂದು ನ್ಯಾಯಾಲಯವು ವಾಸ್ತವವಾಗಿ ವಿಧಿಸಿದ ಅನಿರ್ದಿಷ್ಟ ದಂಡನೆಯಲ್ಲಿನ ಕನಿಷ್ಠ ಅವಧಿಯು ಅಧಿಕೃತ ಸೆರೆವಾಸದ ಅವಧಿ ಎಂದು ಅಮೇರಿಕದ ಸರ್ವೋಚ್ಚ ನ್ಯಾಯಾಲಯ ಸೇರಿದಂತೆ ಅಮೇರಿಕ ಸಂಯುಕ್ತ ಸಂಸ್ಥಾನದ ನ್ಯಾಯಾಲಯಗಳು ಗುರುತಿಸಿವೆ.^[೨] ಬೇರೆ ರೀತಿ ಹೇಳುವುದಾದರೆ, ಪ್ರತಿವಾದಿಯ ಅನಿರ್ದಿಷ್ಟ ದಂಡನೆಯ ಭಾಗವಾಗಿ ನ್ಯಾಯಾಲಯವು ಆದೇಶಿಸಿದ ಯಾವುದೇ "ಬೀದಿ ಸಮಯ"ವು (ಅಂದರೆ, ಪರೀಕ್ಷಾರ್ಥ ಶಿಕ್ಷಾಸ್ಥಗನ, ಪರೋಲ್ ಅಥವಾ ಮೇಲ್ವಿಚಾರಿತ ಬಿಡುಗಡೆ) ಸೆರೆವಾಸದ ಅವಧಿ ಎಂದು ಅನಿಸಿಕೊಳ್ಳುವುದಿಲ್ಲ.^[೩]

ಉಲ್ಲೇಖಗಳು

↑ See, e.g., ಟೆಂಪ್ಲೇಟು:Uscsub; United States v. Pray, 373 F.3d 358, 361 (3d Cir. 2004) ("In ordinary usage, 'imprisonment' generally means physical confinement."); Commonwealth v. Conahan, 589 A.2d 1107, 1110 (Pa. 1991) ("Conahan voluntarily committed himself to inpatient custodial alcohol rehabilitation, which he successfully completed after devoting ninety-five continuous days towards overcoming his disease. We find that his successful completion of this custodial inpatient rehabilitation, which took place in three hospitals, falls within the common meaning of 'imprisonment'.")
↑ United States v. Valencia-Mendoza, ___ F.3d ___, ___, No. 17-30158 Archived 2019-04-30 ವೇಬ್ಯಾಕ್ ಮೆಷಿನ್ ನಲ್ಲಿ., p.20-21 & n.4 (9th Cir. Jan. 10, 2019) (stating that courts of appeals "have held that, when determining whether a [state] offense is 'punishable' by more than one year in prison, the Supreme Court's recent cases require an examination of the maximum sentence possible under the state's mandatory sentencing guidelines.")
↑ United States v. Parsons, No. 15-2055, at p.10 (3d Cir. Nov. 10, 2016) (unpublished); United States v. Rodriguez-Bernal, 783 F.3d 1002, 1006 (5th Cir. 2015); United States v. Pettus, 303 F.3d 480 (2d Cir. 2002) (regarding "street time"); Young v. Pa. Board of Probation and Parole, No. 361 C.D. 2016 (Commonwealth Court of Pa. June 12, 2018) (regarding "street time"); United States v. Pray, 373 F.3d 358, 361 (3d Cir. 2004) ("We hold that the term 'imprisonment' ... does not include parole.... A person who is on parole, although subject to some restraints on liberty, is not 'imprisoned' in the sense in which the term is usually used. For example, if a parolee were informed at the end of a parole revocation hearing that the outcome was 'imprisonment,' the parolee would not think that this meant that he was going to be returned to parole.") (citations omitted); Young v. Pa. Board of Probation and Parole, 409 A.2d 843, 846-47 (Pa. 1979) ("To attempt to equate a parole status with that of custody is to ignore reality."); accord Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972).

[1] See, e.g., ಟೆಂಪ್ಲೇಟು:Uscsub; United States v. Pray, 373 F.3d 358, 361 (3d Cir. 2004) ("In ordinary usage, 'imprisonment' generally means physical confinement."); Commonwealth v. Conahan, 589 A.2d 1107, 1110 (Pa. 1991) ("Conahan voluntarily committed himself to inpatient custodial alcohol rehabilitation, which he successfully completed after devoting ninety-five continuous days towards overcoming his disease. We find that his successful completion of this custodial inpatient rehabilitation, which took place in three hospitals, falls within the common meaning of 'imprisonment'.")

[United_States_v._Valencia-Mendoza-2] United States v. Valencia-Mendoza, ___ F.3d ___, ___, No. 17-30158 Archived 2019-04-30 ವೇಬ್ಯಾಕ್ ಮೆಷಿನ್ ನಲ್ಲಿ., p.20-21 & n.4 (9th Cir. Jan. 10, 2019) (stating that courts of appeals "have held that, when determining whether a [state] offense is 'punishable' by more than one year in prison, the Supreme Court's recent cases require an examination of the maximum sentence possible under the state's mandatory sentencing guidelines.")

[probation-3] United States v. Parsons, No. 15-2055, at p.10 (3d Cir. Nov. 10, 2016) (unpublished); United States v. Rodriguez-Bernal, 783 F.3d 1002, 1006 (5th Cir. 2015); United States v. Pettus, 303 F.3d 480 (2d Cir. 2002) (regarding "street time"); Young v. Pa. Board of Probation and Parole, No. 361 C.D. 2016 (Commonwealth Court of Pa. June 12, 2018) (regarding "street time"); United States v. Pray, 373 F.3d 358, 361 (3d Cir. 2004) ("We hold that the term 'imprisonment' ... does not include parole.... A person who is on parole, although subject to some restraints on liberty, is not 'imprisoned' in the sense in which the term is usually used. For example, if a parolee were informed at the end of a parole revocation hearing that the outcome was 'imprisonment,' the parolee would not think that this meant that he was going to be returned to parole.") (citations omitted); Young v. Pa. Board of Probation and Parole, 409 A.2d 843, 846-47 (Pa. 1979) ("To attempt to equate a parole status with that of custody is to ignore reality."); accord Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972).

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